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Appellant: Richard L. Skankey, d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall 
Respondents: Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. 
Petersen, and John M. Hammond d/b/a THOMAS, PETERSEN, 
HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court is authorized pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2-2(3)(i) (1953, as amended), to hear Lhis appeal from the Thud 
District Court for the reason that the Utah Court of Appeals does not 
have original jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 
(1953, as amended). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NO. 1: Does the Utah Architects' and Builders' Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) 
violate the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 11? 
ISSUE NO. 2: Does the Utah Tort Reform Act, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-27-38, et. seq., (1953 as amended 1986) require the Re-
spondents' presence in this case? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The P l a i n t i f f , Karen S t i l l i n g , f i l ed a Complaint against the 
Appellant on February 17, 1987, alleging that she was injured at the 
Olympus Hills Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 29, 1986. The 
Plaintiff f i led an Amended Complaint, on November 16, 1987, naming the 
Respondents as Co-Defendants in that case. The Appellant f i led a 
Cross-Claim against the Respondents on February 16, 1988. 
The Respondents moved the Third District Court to dismiss, with 
prejudice, the Plaint i f f 's Complaint against the Respondents on 
December 30, 1987. The Third District Court granted the Respondents1 
Motion to Dismiss the Plaint i f f 's Complaint against the Respondents on 
February 19, 1988, and on April 25, 1988, Judge Moffat certified the 
Amended Order of Dismissal of the Plaint i f f 's Complaint as a Final 
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su i t against the Appellant in the Third D i s t r i c t Court of Salt Lake 
County, on February 17, 1987, charging t the Appellant with breaching 
his duty to warn business invitees of known dangers on the premises. 
Record, 2-6. 
The P l a i n t i f f amended her Complaint on November 16, 1987 and added 
the Respondents as Defendants in her su i t . In her Amended Complaint, 
the P l a i n t i f f alleged that the Respondents had not adequately designed 
the parking lo t where her in jur ies had allegedly occurred. 
On February 16, 1988, the Appellant f i l e d his Answer to the Plain-
t i f f ' s Amended Complaint, and included a Cross-Claim against the Re-
spondents asserting that i f , arguendo, the parking lo t at the Olympus 
H i l l s Mall was unsafe, then Respondents should indemnify the Appellant 
for any damages the Court might assess against the Appellant. Record, 
pp. 85-90. 
The Respondents f i l e d Motions to Dismiss both the P l a i n t i f f ' s 
Complaint and the Appellant's Cross-Claim based on the argument that 
the Archi tects ' Statute of Repose barred both the P l a i n t i f f and the 
Appellant from bringing actions against the Respondents more than 
seven years after the Date of Substantial Completion of the Olympus 
H i l l s Mal l . 
In separate Orders of Dismissal, granted on February 19, 1988 and 
Apr i l 8, 1988, Judge Moffat granted the Respondents1 Motions to Dis-
miss both the P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint and the Appellant's Cross-Claim. 
Record pp. 190-195. On April 25, 1988, Judge Moffat certified those 
dismissals as Final Judgments. On May 12, 1988, the Appellant f i led 
his Notice of Appeal from Judge Moffat's dismissal of his Cross-Claim. 
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The P l a i n t i f f fa i led to appeal Judge Moffat's dismissal of her 
Complaint against the Respondents. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents assert that Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25.5 
(1953 as amended), (hereinafter "Architects' Statute of Repose",) in 
no way violates Article I , Section 11, of the Utah Constitution. Se£ 
Addendum. The Respondents further argue that the Architects' Statute 
of Repose can be distinguished from Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-15-3 (1953 as amended), (hereinafter the Product Liabil i ty Statute 
of Repose), which was recently ruled unconstitutional by this Court's 
decision of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) 
(hereinafter "Berry"). Additionally, the Respondents maintain that 
the Architects' Statute of Repose meets the constitutionality tests in 
Berry by: 1) providing an alternative remedy to an injured plaint i f f ; 
and 2) eliminating a clear and distinct social and economic ev i l . 
The Respondents also argue that the Appellant is not entitled to 
indemnification from the Respondents for the reason that the Tort Re-
form Act only requires a party to be responsible for that proportion 
of the fault which can be fair ly attributed to i t . Since the Appel-
lant is not responsible for the fault of any other party, i t follows 
that the Appellant cannot sue the Respondents for indemnification. 
INTRODUCTION 
In addressing the potential l i ab i l i ty of design professionals 
regarding structures for which they rendered design service, state 
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courts have refused to honor the h is to r i c , common-law contractual 
p r i v i t y defense, but rather they have expanded the l i a b i l i t y of design 
professionals and contractors to injured parties based on varying t o r t 
theories. However, such l i a b i l i t y is not unlimited and is subject to 
specif ic res t r ic t ions under careful ly defined circumstances. 
The Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code annotated Section 
78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) commonly known as the " A r c h i t e c t ' s 
Statute of Repose", which l i m i t s the t ime, f o l l ow ing the formal 
completion of an improvement to real p roper ty , dur ing which an 
allegedly aggrieved p l a i n t i f f may sue an archi tect or contractor with 
respect to an al legation that a defective design or fau l ty construc-
t ion led to the p l a i n t i f f ' s in ju ry . Addi t ional ly, the Utah Legisla-
ture has recently enacted the Tort Reform Act, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-27-38, et sea., (1953 as amended 1986) which l im i ts any 
defendant 's l i a b i l i t y to that propor t ion of f a u l t which can be 
at t r ibuted to that defendant. 
This Court recently addressed the matter of the const i tu t iona l i ty 
of the Utah Product L i a b i l i t y Statute of Repose in Berry. In the 
Berry case, t h i s Court declared that the Utah Product L i a b i l i t y 
Statute of Repose was unconstitutional for the reason that i t 
v io lated, inter a l i a , Art ic le I , Section 11 , of the Utah State 
Constitution, Addendum, by denying the Plaintiffs a reasonable 
opportunity to bring a suit. In sum, this Court determined that the 
Utah Product Liabil ity Statute of Repose did not provide the 
Plaint i f fs, in Berry, with any alternative remedy against an^ party 
once the statutory period had run. 
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In the Instant case, the Appellant argues, In Point 1 of his 
Brief, that the Berry ruling ought to extend beyond cases sounding In 
product l iab i l i ty theory to cases which are based, Inter a l ia , upon an 
allegation of the negligent rendering of professional architectural 
design services. Appellant bases this argument on the grounds that 
there Is otherwise no substitute remedy to which he, as Co-Defendant 
and property owner (but nc»t as the Injured party and p la in t i f f ) , may 
have access as he pursues the Respondents who, more than 10 years ago, 
rendered service to the Appellant. Appellant's Brief pp. 7-9. In 
response, the Respondents argue: 1) the facts of the Berry case are 
Inapplicable to, and can be distinguished from, this case; 2) the 
Architects' Statute of Repose satisfies the two-pronged constitutiona-
l i t y test as enunciated in Berry; and 3) the Appellant is not legally 
entitled to pursue an indemnification claim against the Respondents. 
Additionally, the Appellant argues, in Point I I of his Brief, 
that even i f the Architects' Statute of Repose is found constitu-
tional, the dismissal of his Cross-Claim against the Respondents was 
precluded by operation of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-41 (1953 
as amended 1986). Appellant's Brief , pp. 9-12. In reply, the 
Respondents maintain that the Utah Tort Reform Act does not permit the 
Appellant to sue the Respondents for indemnification because the 
Appellant is only liable for his own torts regarding injuries arising 
on hvs property due to unsafe conditions. Therefore, as a matter of 




THE ARCHITECTS1 STATUTE OF REPOSE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE lf SECTION 11, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
A. THIS COURT HAS RULED THAT THE ARCHITECTS' 
STATUTE OF REPOSE IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
On several occasions, this Court has addressed the va l id i t y of 
the Architects1 Statute of Repose and found i t to be const i tu t ional . 
This Court, in the case of Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 
1974), speci f ica l ly held that the seven-year l im i ta t ion imposed by 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) was^  
const i tu t iona l . In so ru l ing , this Court found that the Architects' 
Statute of Repose p r o h i b i t s any act ion against an a r c h i t e c t or 
bui lder, with respect to their work regarding any improvement to real 
properly alleged to be defective or unsof Repose and found i t to be 
const i tu t ional . This Court, in the case of Good v. Christensen, 527 
P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), speci f ica l ly held that the seven-year l im i ta t ion 
imposed by Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) 
was const i tu t iona l . In so ru l i ng , this Court found that the 
Archi tects ' Statute of Repose prohibi ts any action against an 
archi tect or bui lder, with respect to their work regarding any im-
provement to real properly alleged to be defective or unsafe, which is 
f i l e d outside the statutory period. In Good v. Christensen, this 
Court declared: 
The exception in the statute makes inapplicable the 
seven-year l im i ta t ion period against the or ig inal own-
er, and i t allows others to sue him for t o r t s , i f any, 
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within the regular statutes of limitations after the 
cause arises. I t prevents the OWNER, as well as a l l 
others, from suing the designer, planner, supervisor 
or contractor after seven years from completion of the 
project, (emphasis added). 
I(L at 224-225 
In the case of Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987), 
the Architects1 Statute of Repose once again withstood a constitution-
al challenge. In Jackson, this Court reaffirmed the constitutionality 
of the Architects' Statute of Repose previously upheld in Good v. 
Christensen. The Jackson Court found that the Architects1 Statute of 
Repose, unlike the Product Liability Statute of Repose, did not arbi-
t rar i ly deprive a plainti f f of a cause of action. 
In a concurring opinion in the Jackson case, Justice Howe clearly 
set out the Court's intention regarding any challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the Architects' Statute of Repose when he observed: 
A cause of action for personal injury generally accrues 
when the accident occurs, and the four-year statute of 
limitations begins to run at that time on any action 
against the owner. 
In contrast, when an action for personal injuries is 
brought by a third person against a designer, planner, 
or builder of an improvement, the four-year statute of 
limitations also commences to run on the date of the 
accident unless seven years have expired since the 
completion of the construction of the improvement. In 
that event, Section 78-12-25.5 provides that the third 
person has no cause of action at a l l against the 
designer, planner, or builder. However, i f any part of 
the seven-year period remains at the time the accident 
occurs, the injured third person has the remainder of 
the seven-year period, but not to exceed four years, to 
bring his action for personal in jur ies . In other 
words, the seven-year statute provides the outer l imit , 
but within that time frame, the four-year statute 
operates. 0'Conner v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 335 A. 2d 
545 (1975); Annot. 93 A.L. r 3d 1242, 1268 (1979) 
(emphasis added). 
Id. at 1199. 
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For the reason that this Court has repeatedly declared that the 
Architects' Statute of Respose is constitutional, the Appellant is not 
entitled to pursue the Respondents merely because the Plaintiff has a 
surviving cause of action against the Appellant. As this Court de-
clared in Good v. Christensen, no party may sue the architect once the 
statutory period has expired, no matter their position or description. 
In the present case, the facts clearly demonstrate that the 
Appellant did not f i l e his Cross-Complaint until nine years after the 
Date of Substantial Completion of the "addition/remodeling" project at 
the Olympus Hills Mall. See Addendum. By statute, the Appellant had 
only seven years, after the Date of Substantial Completion of the 
Olympus Hills Mall, to f i l e an action against the Respondents based 
upon any alleged defective design; he failed to do so. Under well-
established Utah law, the time during which the Respondents were amen-
able to any action, based upon any alleged defects in their design, 
began on November 21, 1978, and ended at midnight on November 20, 
1985. Consequently, the Appellant is nearly two years too late in 
f i l ing his Cross-Claim against the Respondents. 
Appellant's arguments are tantamount to asking this Court to 
overrule its decisions 1n Good v. Christensen and Jackson v. Layton 
City. Since there are no compelling legal or factual reasons to 
overrule this Court's well-established precedents, this Court should 
dismiss Appellant's Appeal. 
B. THE RULING IN BERRY IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The Appellant urges this Court to extend its ruling in Berry to 
this case by arguing, inter a l ia , that the Open Courts provision of 
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the Utah State Constitution must overcome the effect and advisability 
of Utah's Architects' Statute of Repose - the same argument advanced 
by the Plaintiff In Jackson. 
However, the Berry case Is distinguishable from the present case 
and therefore Irrelevant to the matter at hand. A careful reading and 
analysis of Berry clearly establishes that the operant facts of Berry 
are In no way analogous to the facts of this matter. The Berry case 
Involved a product l iab i l i ty claim against the Defendant after one of 
the Defendant's aircraft disintegrated In f l ight , ki l l ing several 
people. The Product Liability Statute of Repose did not provide the 
Plaint i f fs, In Berry, with an alternative remedy I f the f i l ing dead-
line was missed. Unlike the provisions of the Architects' Statute of 
Repose, the Product Liability Statute of Repose precluded an^ action 
from being f i led against anj£ person or party once the statutory period 
of repose had expired. Therefore, this Court declared, the "Open 
Courts" provisions of the Utah Constitution had been violated by the 
statute's prohibitions against the f i l ing of an^ action once the 
statutory limitation period had passed. 
I f this Court had intended to extend its ruling in Berry to cases 
other than those sounding in products l iab i l i ty theory, i t could have 
expressly declared its intention to do so in the Berry case. No 
language in Berry, either in the ruling or in dicta, suggests that 
this Court intended to hold, or even suggest, that the statutes of 
limitations, as the same apply to architects, are unconstitutional. 
In fact, this Court made 1t clear that the Berry decision was strictly 
limited Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-15-1, et seq. ("Utah Product 
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Liabil i ty Act"), and was not intended to invalidate al l statutes of 
repose, by declaring: 
In sum, Section 11 does not recede before every legislative 
enactment, but neither may i t be applied in a mechanical 
fashion to strike every statute with which there may be a 
conflict. To hold every statute of repose unconstitutional 
without regard to the legislative purpose could result in a 
leg is la t ive inab i l i t y to cope with widespread social or 
economic evils (emphasis added). 
Id, at 680. 
In Berry, this Court observed, in relevant and signif icant 
dicta, that the Architects' Statute of Repose was constitutional in 
application i f only those persons who rendered professional design ser-
vices, or who performed construction, were exempt from a p la int i f f 's 
suit once the statutory period had run. Citing its earlier decision in 
Good v. Christensen, the Berry Court stated: 
Good v. Christensen, Utah, 527 P. 2d 223 (1974), 
sustained the constitutionality of a seven year 
statute of repose intended to protect architects 
and builders. The court observed that a person 
injured by a defect in a building would s t i l l have 
a remedy against an owner of the building and per-
haps others, (emphasis added). 
Ld. at 683. 
This Court has not extended the "Open Courts" constitutionality 
test in Berry to any case which did not involve an allegation sounding 
in products liability law, even when the opportunity to do so arose in 
a subsequent case. In fact, in Berry, this Court specifically add-
ressed the question of whether the unconstitutionality of the Product 
Liability Statute of Repose could be applied to other statutes of 
repose. After reviewing a wide array of cases, in which statutes of 
repose involving liability, medical malpractice and claims arising out 
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of the services of architects and builders were discussed, this Court 
clearly declared that, in Utah, products l iab i l i ty cases were the only 
sort of claim under which they would declare a statute of repose 
unconstitutional as violative of the "Open Courts" provisions of the 
Utah State Constitution. Id. at 678-680. 
In the Jackson case, which was subsequent to Berry, this Court 
was presented with an opportunity to extend the constitutional test of 
Berry to Architects' Statute of Repose. In Jackson, the Plaintiff had 
been injured in an accident sustained on Layton City's sleigh riding 
and tubing h i l l . In upholding the District Court's dismissal of the 
Plaint i f f 's Complaint, this Court declared that the seven-year 
limitation imposed by the Architects' Statute of Repose was enforce-
able as i t applied to the Defendant municipality. The Jackson Court 
had every opportunity to apply the Berry ruling to the Jackson facts: 
there was a grievously injured pla int i f f , an Owner who designed and 
performed the improvements and was s t i l l in possession of the property 
at the time of the injury, a "deep pocket", and the possible denial of 
a remedy to the Plaintiff i f the dismissal of the case was upheld. 
However, in spite of that legally and emotionally charged atmos-
phere, this Court refused to declare the Architects' Statute of Repose 
unconstitutional. In fact, this Court specifically addressed the 
applicability of the Berry ruling to the facts in Jackson, and found 
the Architects' Statute of Respose constitutional. In so doing, this 
Court rejected the Plaint i f f 's claim that Architects' Statute of Re-
pose was unconstitutional because i t had the effect of barring an 
action before the events giving rise to the cause of action actually 
occurred (exactly the argument raised by the Plaintiffs in Berry). 
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In refusing to find the Architects' Statute of Repose unconsti-
tutional, this Court observed that the Plaintiffs would have had an 
effective remedy against the City of Layton had they not been dilatory 
in their conduct. By not extending the Berry ruling to the Jackson 
facts, the Court understood that its ruling effectively denied the 
Plaintiffs any remedy against any party, specifically the City of 
Layton which was both the designer/builder and owner-in-possession. 
In the instant case, the Appellant's Cross-Claim alleges that he 
is entitled to pursue an action against the Respondents for indemnifi-
cation for any of the Plaint i f f 's injuries for which the Appellant may 
be assessed. However, neither in his Cross-Claim nor in his Appel-
lant's Brief, does the Appellant argue that the facts of this case are 
legally equivalent to the products l iab i l i ty claim brought by the 
Plaintiffs in Berry. Moreover, the Appellant did not plead his case 
against the Respondents based upon negligent design, but only plead an 
indemnification theory. 
In the present case, the P l a i n t i f f can maintain her action 
against the Appellant for damages; therefore, the Plaintiff has a sig-
nificant remedy which she is presently pursuing. In fact, the Plain-
t i f f ' s abil i ty to pursue the Appellant exists independently of whether 
or not the Appellant can sue the Respondents. Merely because the 
Plaintiff is able to pursue her claim against the Plaint i f f , i t does 
not follow that the Appellant is legally entitled to maintain his 
action against the Respondents. 
The Appellant is jnot entitled to assume the legal status and 
position of the Plaintiff by arguing that legal standards that enable 
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the Plaintiff to sue the Appellant entitle the Appellant, as owner of 
the premises, to bring an action against the Respondents. Therefore, 
the Appellant is not entitled to raise the arguments that the 
Plaintiffs raised in Berry. By parity of reasoning, the Appellant is 
not entitled to apply the Berry ruling to these facts of this case 
simply because that the Architects' Statute of Repose provides the 
Plaintiff with a remedy. 
C. THE ARCHITECTS' STATUTE OF RESPOSE DOES NOT ARBITRARILY 
DEPRIVE A PLAINTIFF OF ALL REMEDIES. 
The Appellant has argued that if the Respondents are dismissed 
from this suit, a fundamental offense to commonly held notions of 
justice and fairness would occur by placing the "...defendant land-
owner in an untenable and inequitable legal quagmire." Appellants' 
Brief, p. 8. The Appellant, as Co-Defendant, wishes to convince this 
Court that he is in the same position as the Plaintiffs were in Berry. 
In part, Berry turned on whether the Plaintiffs were arbitrarily 
deprived of a remedy, not whether the Defendant was deprived of a 
claim for indemnification. In his Brief, the Appellant, rather than 
discussing the factual similiarities between Berry and the case at 
hand, merely treats this Court to a cursory restatement of the general 
principles of equitable law. 
In Berry, this Court observed that a statute of repose will meet 
the test of Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution "1f the law 
provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy 'by due course of law' for vindication of his constitutional 
interests." Berry at 680; Se£ Also Addendum. The Berry Court went on 
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to declare that the substituted remedy must be substantial ly equal in 
value to the remedy abrogated and must equivalently protect a party's 
physical i n teg r i t y , property or reputation "although the form of the 
remedy may be d i f f e ren t . " I d . 
The provisions of the Architects1 Statute of Repose do not de-
prive a p l a i n t i f f of a remedy to redress a personal in jury which arose 
on the s i te of a real property improvement. The Architects1 Statute of 
Repose only prohibi ts a sui t against an architect or builder (but not 
an owner) more than seven years fol lowing the Date of Substantial 
Completion. Unlike the Product L i a b i l i t y Statute of Repose, and the 
Berry case upon which the Appellant mistakenly rests his arguments, 
the Architects ' Statute of Repose does not act as a bar to a^ l e f for ts 
of a p l a i n t i f f to recover for an in ju ry , real or imagined. 
The Archi tects ' Statute of Repose only l im i ts i t s protection to 
those ent i t ies or persons who actually design or perform the construc-
t ion work regarding the improvement to real property, and n£t to 
others. The provisions of the Archi tects ' Statute of Repose do not 
a r b i t r a r i l y deprive a p l a i n t i f f from pursuing the owner-in-possession 
once the architect is insulated from a lawsuit by operation of the 
Archi tects ' Statute of Repose. 
Since the Appellant, as owner-in-possession, has a continuing 
common law and statutory duty to maintain the safe condition of his 
property, he is obliged to meet those legal obligations to the Plain-
t i f f . Those obligations exist even 1f the Respondents had never been 
named in the sui t . At this point 1n time, only the Appellant 1s 
prevented from pursuing the Respondents whose services were rendered 
- 16 -
more than seven years prior to date of the alleged Injury. Such a 
limitation Is not the sort of event which can reasonably support the 
assertion that the Architects' Statute of Repose Is unconstitutional. 
In this case, the Plaint i f f 's right to pursue the Appellant for 
damages Is expressly preserved In the provisions of Section 78-12-25.5 
which, In subsection 2, provides: 
The time limitation Imposed by this section does 
not apply to any person 1n actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the 
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of the Improvement constitutes the proxi-
mate cause of the Injury for which an action Is 
brought, (emphasis added). 
Clearly, the Plaintiff In the Instant matter Is not deprived of 
a l l causes of action by the operation of the Architects' Statute of 
Repose. The Plaintiff can fully recover for ]jer Injuries against the 
Appellant I f this Court upholds the provisions of Architects' Statute 
of Repose. Therefore, the real Issue before this Court Is whether or 
not the Appellant, who may be required to compensate the Plaintiff for 
her In jur ies , can apply the Berry const i tut ional i ty test to the 
Respondents' presence In this case. 
D. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ARCHITECTS' STATUTE OF REPOSE 
AVOIDS THE OCCURENCE OF AN ECONOMIC EVIL. 
Under the law, an Injured plaint i f f Is entitled to f i l e an action 
against a property owner for fall ing to discover a latent or patent 
defect In a construction project. The release of an architect from 
l i ab i l i t y , after seven years following the Date of Substantial 
Completion, serves to avoid the economic evi l of subjecting an 
architect to unlimited l i ab i l i t y . Because the nature and Identity of 
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an alleged design defect may be significantly altered by events which 
occur subsequent to the completion of a building project, an architect 
ought to be released from any further l iab i l i ty at such time as the 
legislature determines such a release is sensible and equitable. 
The Architects' Statute of Repose does not only l imit an 
architect's protection to only suits from injured plaint i f fs , but 
covers aj2 suits against architects which are based upon allegations 
of defective design when fi led past the statutory deadline. The 
public policy behind protecting design professionals after a certain 
point acquires greater force when an architect is sued by a party who 
was in actual, uninterrupted ownership, management and occupancy of 
the property from the time of the completion of the project through 
the date of the injury and the subsequent suit. 
Without some statutory protection for an architect, the l iab i l i ty 
that the design professional now accepts for the f i rs t seven years of 
a construction project's l i f e would extend indefinitely. The 
possiblity of unrestrained l iab i l i ty would have a chilling effect on 
the contributions of architects to society, thus denying society the 
value and benefit of their services. Several courts have recognized 
the need to protect architects and builders from unlimited l iab i l i ty 
through the enactment of sensible statutes of repose. See Barnhouse 
v. Pinote. 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. App. 1982); Chesworld Volunteer 
Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co. 489 A. 2d 413 (Del. 1984); 
Beecher v. White, 417 N.E. 2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983). 
By arguing that "the cutting off of the landowner's right of 
indemnification against the allegedly negligent architect furthers no 
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compelling social policy and eliminates no social or economic e v i l . . . " 
Appellant's Brief, p.8, the Appellant attempts to make use of the 
2-pronged Berry case to assert that the Architects' Statute of Repose 
also does not serve any justifiable social or economic policy. For 
the reason that the Appellant, as the landowner, has a duty to 
maintain the premises in a safe condition, the Appellant cannot place 
i tself in the position of the Plaintiffs in Berry. Consequently, 
affirming the dismissal of the Appellant's Cross-Claim wil l not burden 
the Appellant with any duty not arising independently, and w i l l 
further the broad social interest in insulating architects from suits 
after the seven year statutory period. 
POINT TWO 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 78-27-41 (1953 AS AMENDED 1986) DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF RESPONDENTS IN THIS CASE. 
In his Brief, the Appellant asserts that the Utah Tort Reform 
Act requires the Respondents' presence in this case in order for the 
Third District Court to determine how the percentage or portion of the 
alleged negligence should be distributed between the Appellant and the 
Respondent. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11. However, a careful 
analysis of the relevant Utah Code sections, which define the para-
meters of tort liability, reveal that the Appellant's position is 
without legal justification. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-38 (1953 as amended 1986) 
provides: 
The fault of any person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant or 
group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no 
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defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the portion of fault attributable to that 
defendant, (emphasis added). 
In pertinent part, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-40 (1953 as 
amended 1986), declares: 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the per-
centage or proportion of fault attributed to the defendant. No 
defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person, 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-41 (1953 as amended 1986) 
further states: 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to 
the litigation, ma^ join as parties any defendants who may have 
caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery 
is sought, for the purpose of having determined their respective 
portion of fault, (emphasis added). 
As the Appellant correctly asserts in his Brief, "the fundamen-
tal premise of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is that each defendant is 
only liable for that portion of damages attributable to the fault of 
that defendant." Se£ Appellant's Brief, p. 9. However, the Appellant 
totally misunderstands the application of that premise to the facts of 
this case. 
The Appellant mistakenly asserts that aJJ. parties who may have 
potential liability to a plaintiff must be joined as defendants in a 
case in order that the liability of an^ of the defendants may be de-
termined. Se£ Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11. Such a result clearly was 
not the Intent of the legislature when it passed the Tort Reform Act. 
Furthermore, the express language of Section 78-27-41 is 1n direct 
opposition to the Appellant's assertion. 
In pertinent part, Section 78-21-41, states: "A person seeking 
recovery or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, ma^ join 
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as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
in jury . . . . " (emphasis added). The term "shall11 does not appear in 
Section 78-21-41, as i t does 1n other sections of the Utah Code; 
therefore, i t is reasonable to conclude that Section 78-21-41 does n£t 
mandate that al l persons who may have potentially l i ab l i l i t y to a 
plaint i f f must be joined in an action. Section 78-21-41 correctly 
recognizes the l i t igants1 right to determine the parties to an action. 
Section 78-21-41 also does not require, as the Appellant argues, that 
"all fault contributing to an injury would have to be concurrently 
analyzed by the jury". See Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Section 78-21-41 
only sets out a discretionary standard. 
The Appellant cannot properly ask this Court to accept the 
assertion that the Appellant's potential l iab i l i ty to the Plaintiff 
wil l incrementally increase or decrease relative to the number of 
litigants present in the case. Se£ Appellant's Brief pp. 10-11. Such 
an assertion is an absurdity. The facts of the case will determine 
the Appellant's percentage or portion of negligence, not the number of 
litigants present in the case. Any l iab i l i ty the Appellant may have 
to the Plaintif f wil l then be determined by multiplying the 
Plaint i f f 's total damages by the percentage or portion of negligence 
attributable to the Appellant. 
In his Brief, the Appellant assumes that the finder of fact in 
an action must allocate al l fault among the parties to that action. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Such an assumption is incorrect. The find-
er of fact is not prohibited from determining that a percentage or 
portion of l i ab i l i ty should be properly assigned to a person or per-
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sons n^ ot named as defendants in the action. Proper jury instructions 
and Special Verdict Forms are regularly used to allocate l iab i l i ty to 
persons who, for a variety of reasons, are not parties to the l i t iga-
tion. Consequently, and contrary to the Appellant's assertion, the 
absence of the Respondents from this case will not result in a propor-
tional shift of the Respondents1 potential l iab i l i ty to the Appellant. 
POINT THREE 
APPELLANT'S ASSERTION OF A CLAIM OF INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST THE 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS1 
PRESENCE IN THIS CASE. 
In his Cross-Claim, the Appellant has demanded "judgment of in-
demnification against Respondents with respect to any liablity adjudg-
ed against the Appellant in this action, together with any costs." 
Record, pp. 88-89. However, in his Cross-Claim, as well as in his 
Brief to this Court, the Appellant has failed to allege any factual 
basis, or to cite any authority, which would entitle the Appellant to 
an award of indemnification against the Respondents. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, Section 78-27-38, et 
seq. in pertinent part, declares: "[N]o defendant is liable to any 
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the portion of 
fault attributable to that defendant." In relevant part, Section 
78-27-40 also provides that: "No defendant is entitled to contribution 
from any other person." Therefore, the Appellant 1s not legally 
entitled to be Indemnified by the Respondents for any liability which 
the Plaintiff may be able to prove against the Appellant. Furthermore, 
the Appellant is, by statute, prohibited from obtaining indemnlfi-
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cation from the Respondents, the very rel ief which the Appellant seeks 
by way of his Cross-Claim fi led in the Third District Court. 
The Plaintif f can only sue the Appellant for the negligence of 
the Appellant, not the negligence of the Respondents. Since the 
Appellant is not entitled to be indemnified for his own negligence, 
and cannot be held liable for any alleged negligence of the part of 
the Respondents, the Respondents, as a matter of law, are not 
obligated to indemnify the Appellant. 
I f the Appellant had sought to keep the Respondents in this case, 
regardless of the actions or inactions of the Plaint i f f , the Appellant 
could have framed the totality of his pleadings to sound in 
professional negligence. But even i f the Appellent's Cross-Claim had 
alleged defective design, the Tort Reform Act only obliges a party to 
be responsible for his own negligence, and not for the supposed 
negligence of another. 
Because the Plaintiff failed to appeal the dismissal of her Com-
plaint against the Respondents, the Respondents have n£ potential l i a -
b i l i ty to the Plaint i f f . Surely, when the Utah Legislature passed the 
Tort Reform Act, i t did not intend that a person with no potential 
l iab i l i ty in an action must be a party to that action simply because 
another defendant argues that its case wil l be made easier i f the per-
son with no potential l i ab i l i ty is present in the case. Such a posi-
tion would lead to untenable results. 
For instance, i f the Appellant and Respondents were willing to 
make a deal, the Respondents could conceivably admit to al l negligence 
associated with the Plaint i f f 's injuries. Yet, because the Plaintiff 
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has failed to appeal the dismissal of her claim against the Respon-
dents, the Plaintiff could collect nothing from the Respondents. This 
strategy would also eliminate any concern the Respondents might have 
concerning the Appellant's Cross-Claim, as the Appellant would not be 
adjudged liable for any of the Plaintiff's Injuries. Therefore, the 
Appellant's claim for Indemnification for any negligence adjudged 
against him would also evaporate. 
Alternatively, because the Respondents have no potential lia-
bility to the Plaintiff, the Respondents could merely choose to Ignore 
the District Court proceeding altogether and allow the finder of fact 
to assign any percentage or portion of negligence, and the resultant 
liability, to the Respondents. Again, because the Respondents have no 
potential liability to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could collect 
nothing from the Respondents, Absent a sweetheart deal between the 
Appellant and Respondents, there Is simply no reason for the Respon-
dents to participate In the Third District Court proceeding. 
Consequently, If the Respondents are required to participate In 
the District Court proceeding, the Respondents' presence will simply 
Increase the time and cost of litigation. Such Increases will 
adversely affect the Plaintiff, the Appellant and Respondents, as well 
as result In an Increase 1n the cost and 1n the work load on an 
already overburdened judicial system. Furthermore, no legal advantage 
would Inure to any party In consideration of this additional cost and 
judicial Inefficiency. 
Therefore, simple logic as well as the Interests of justice and 
judicial economy dictate that the Respondents not be forced to remain 
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in an action in which they have no real interests nor any potential 
liability. To construe the provisions of the Tort Reform Act other-
wise would introduce chaos in the judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has repeatedly held that the Architects' Statute of 
Repose does not violate Artice 1, Section 11, of the Utah Constitu-
tion. Se£ Addendum. Section 78-27-41 does not require the 
Respondents' presence in this case. The Third Judicial District Court 
properly dismissed the Appellant's Cross-Claim. 
Therefore, this Court must deny the Appellant's Appeal, and, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Addendum, this Court should award the Respondents their 
costs incurred in this Appeal. 
Dated this 24*3 day of October, 1988. 
GUSTAVSON, SCHULTZ, HALL & WILLIAMS 
Counsel for Respondents 
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ART. I, § 11 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary dolay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
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RILES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT Rule 34 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs 
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the respondent unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, 
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state 
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or 
prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other ex-
penses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the pre-
vailing party in the appeal: The actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief 
and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in 
the preparation and transmission of the record including costs of the re-
porter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for 
supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees for 
filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxes after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party 
in an appeal from a lower court, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days 
after the remittitur is filed with the clerk of the court below, serve upon the 
adverse party and file with the clerk of the court an itemized and verified bill 
of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, 
serve and file a notice of objection together with a motion to have the costs 
taxed by the court below. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the 
allotted time, the clerk of the court shall tax the costs as filed and enter 
judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in 
the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other 
judgments of record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, 
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a 
final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the 
judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judg-
ments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
district court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry 
of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters 
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in 
cases on appeal from a lower court Within 15 days after the expiration of the 
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an 
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded 
may file with the clerk of the court and serve upon the adverse party an 
itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days after 
the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have the 
costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within the 
allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment 
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill, 
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the 
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of 
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A 
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in 
the state who shall docket a certified copy of the~5&me in the manner and with 
the same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
